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AUTHOR’S MAIN MESSAGE
LFP rates have increased trend-wise in the EU. This is primarily due to the upgrading of education levels across most 
countries and age groups. However, increases in the activity rates of the elderly have been larger than expected, even 
taking into account their higher overall levels of education. This combination suggests that pension reforms and 
limits to early retirement have also played a critical role in growing participation rates. Ongoing education expansion, 
especially strong at the tertiary level in south and east Europe and in many Asian countries, should ensure a further 
increase in occupation and participation rates.
ELEVATOR PITCH
Employment and labor force participation (LFP) rates 
have increased throughout Europe since the 1990s, with 
little interruption from the Great Recession. While many 
credit labor market reforms for this progress, ongoing 
educational expansion might actually be more important. 
This implies that the overall employment rate of an 
economy can change if the share of the population with 
tertiary education increases, even in the absence of any 
labor market reforms or effects of the business cycle. 
Taking this compositional effect into account makes it 
possible to disentangle the impact of reforms.
KEY FINDINGS
Cons
The rise in elderly participation rates is easier to 
explain with changes to pension systems than with 
labor market reforms.
It is difficult to pinpoint the impact of particular 
reform episodes on elderly participation rates, 
whether aimed at labor markets or pensions rules.
Changes in overall LFP rates are not reliable 
indicators of the state of the labor market when 
the workforce composition changes.
Pros
In Europe, employment and LFP rates have 
increased trend-wise, since the 1990s, with little 
interruption from the Great Recession.
Due to their higher LFP rates, a rise in the proportion 
of highly educated people will lead to higher overall 
participation rates.
Two-thirds of the improvement in LFP rates observed 
in Europe can be accounted for by the population’s 
increasing educational achievement levels over the 
last decades.
There has been a particularly large increase in 
the LFP rates of the elderly, even accounting for 
the natural increase expected from their higher 
education achievements in 2016 (compared to a 
generation earlier).
Labor force participation rates: US vs EU15 (aged 25–65),
quarterly 1980–2016
Note: EU15 = member countries after EU enlargement in 1995. 
Source: Author’s own compilation based on the AMECO database. Online at:
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/ameco/user/serie/SelectSerie.cfm
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MOTIVATION
Labor market reforms have been on the agenda in Europe for a long time. At the turn of 
the century, conventional wisdom said that not enough people were participating in the 
labor market. This inspired one of the key goals of the Lisbon Agenda, namely to match 
the (then) US employment rate of 70% of the working-age population. This goal was 
almost achieved by the time the financial crisis hit in 2007–2008. The Great Recession has 
since brought unemployment to the fore. But as the recovery strengthens, labor markets 
are again improving, even in the periphery of the Euro area. The key strategic questions 
for European labor markets are thus whether the improvement until 2007–2008 was due 
to reforms or other structural changes in labor supply, and how the cyclical trends can be 
disentangled from the underlying trends?
This article views labor force participation (LFP) rates (understood here as the proportion 
of the working-age population that is either employed or unemployed) as the main 
indicator of the state of a labor market, rather than unemployment or employment rates. 
This is based on the belief that variations in the employment and unemployment rates are 
driven mainly by the business cycle. While achieving an employment rate of 75% remains 
one of the headline goals of the EU’s official Europe 2020 growth strategy, this now 
seems impossible to reach. Before the crisis started in 2007/8, close to 70% of the EU’s 
population aged 15–64 worked. One effect of the crisis is that this percentage declined 
in 19 countries from 2008 to 2013, though the previous peak has now been reached 
again. For most countries, the employment gains during the pre-crisis boom were not 
completely erased during the ensuing recession.
Moreover, the high unemployment rates, which still persist in a few countries, have 
not “discouraged” many workers from leaving the labor force. Contrary to what many 
expected (and what happened in the US) there has actually been an increase, rather than 
a fall, in the EU’s LFP rate since the crisis.
A longer-term view of European labor markets thus suggests a more positive outlook than 
that suggested by unemployment rates alone. The key question is: what are the drivers 
behind this trend-wise increase in participation rates? The European Commission has 
argued that this is due to the wave of labor market reforms passed in the last six years, 
especially in countries with adjustment programs [1]. After the acute phase of the crisis 
passed, reforms concerned job protection, wage setting, and working time. But, reforms 
have also affected other areas, such as unemployment benefits, notably by decreasing 
their generosity while increasing coverage.
A key point to consider is that one additional factor has helped push LFP higher, namely 
educational expansion. Moreover, the increase in LFP has been strongest among one 
segment of the population: the elderly. This suggests that pension reforms, especially 
those affecting early retirement, have been more important than labor market reforms.
DISCUSSION OF PROS AND CONS
One critical choice to make when it comes to the evaluation of the labor market is the 
precise definition of the indicator to use, in this case, LFP (activity) rates. In the US, this is 
usually defined as the ratio of the sum of the employed and the unemployed to the entire 
population over the age of 15 [2], [3]. This indicator is obviously affected by aging: as 
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the proportion of the elderly increases, this ratio falls, since very few of the elderly (above 
the age of 64) work. A different definition has been adopted in this article, namely the 
ratio of the sum of the employed and unemployed to the working-age population. There 
are many different definitions of “working age” used in official statistics. The age bracket 
taken here is 25 to 64, since many 15 to 25-year-olds study instead of work, and any 
increase in the proportion of the young going to college or university might thus show up 
as a lower LFP rate.
To provide some background on participation trends, the illustration on page 1 shows 
the LFP rates of the EU15 (the member countries following EU enlargement in 1995) 
and the US since the 1980s. A very regular upwards trend can be observed for the EU, 
but not for the US. In the US, the activity rate reached a peak in 1990 and then declined 
gradually. By contrast, the activity rate for the EU15 starts in 1980 at 70% and increases 
gradually but continuously (without interruption through the 2007–2008 financial crisis), 
until the ‘euro’ recession of 2011–2012, when it reaches a plateau just below 80%, but 
slightly higher than the US value, which is now below 78%. The last 30 years have thus 
seen a sea change in Europe, with tens of millions more participating in the labor market.
The key role of education
A key empirical pattern with almost universal validity (among OECD countries) is 
that employment and activity rates vary with skill levels. The higher-skilled have higher 
employment rates. For example, in 2013, the average employment rate in the EU of those 
without completed secondary education was about 53%, while it was 83% for those with 
completed tertiary education. Data on unemployment show the mirror image of this, with 
substantially lower rates (by about five percentage points (pp)) for those with a tertiary 
education. Likewise, the difference between the two groups in LFP rates was about 25 
pp (63% without completed secondary versus 88% for those with tertiary education). 
Moreover, the activity rates for those with high educational attainment vary very little 
across countries. For those with tertiary education, the standard deviation across all 
28 EU member states is only 2.4, against 7.4 for those without completed secondary 
education (more on this below).
The observation that people with higher levels of education perform better in the labor 
market is not new [4]. The explanation lies somewhere at the crossroad between human 
capital theory and signaling theory [5], [6]. In terms of the former, employers have a 
preference for workers with higher education levels because they possess a greater body 
of knowledge, which benefits the firm. Such knowledge can be sector-specific, as with 
an engineer who has to compute the resistance of a certain material, or general, like the 
ability to better communicate findings. Signaling, on the other hand, can play a key role 
in the hiring process. Faced with many applications, but little personal information about 
qualifications, a degree from a prestigious institution or better grades might provide a 
signal of general underlying qualities. However, an influential researcher argued in the 
1990s that signaling cannot be a major factor in the long term, since firms would not 
continue to hire graduates for a long time if workers without a degree, but with more 
experience, proved to be more productive [7].
At the individual level, the incentive to take up a job is clearly stronger for the higher-skilled 
since they typically earn much more. In many EU countries, the college wage premium, 
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i.e. the ratio of the average earnings of those with a tertiary degree to those who have 
not completed secondary education, ranges from 120% to over 200%. Moreover, a 
high-skilled person also has a much higher probability of finding a job given the much lower 
unemployment rates for the high-skilled. Thus, for any given reservation wage (i.e. the wage 
that ensures higher income than unemployment benefits), a college graduate has a much 
stronger incentive to participate in the labor market.
An important question to examine is whether superior labor market performances remain 
as higher education becomes a mass phenomenon. The answer is most likely yes [8]. Even 
in the US, where today over 40% of the working-age population has a tertiary degree, 
the LFP rate of the high-skilled remains around 80%, compared with 60% for the low-
skilled (and there are also large differences in the corresponding unemployment rates) 
[9]. Further supporting this conclusion is the fact that activity rates for the high-skilled 
are not lower in countries with a high share of university graduates (compared with other 
countries where a smaller share of the working-age population completed university).
Moreover, as will be documented below, shifts in the composition of the workforce 
toward tertiary graduates are not associated with lower activity rates of the lower-
skilled. This provides another indication that signaling, which might favor graduates at 
the expense of others, cannot be the only explanation for the higher activity rates of 
those with formally higher skills.
The huge difference in employment and LFP rates among those with the lowest and 
highest skills suggests that there could be important compositional effects on the overall 
labor market indicators if the composition of the labor force shifts. For example, if 12% of 
the labor force shifts from the lowest to the highest skill class, and the difference in those 
classes’ LFP rates was originally 25 pp, all else being equal, an increase in the average 
LFP rate of 3 pp would be expected, just because of the composition effect. Changes in 
overall LFP rates are thus unreliable indicators of the state of the labor market when the 
composition changes. Labor market reforms can be said to affect outcomes mainly if a 
change in the employment or LFP rates is observed within skill classes (i.e. especially if the 
low-skilled participate more).
Figure 1 shows the average EU activity rates by skill class and overall for 2000 (the earliest 
year with consistent data available) and 2016. Panel A shows that the composition of 
the working-age population has changed: the share of the low-skilled has fallen by about 
15 pp, whereas that of the high-skilled has increased by a corresponding amount, leaving 
the share of the middle-level little changed at somewhat below one-half.
Panel B shows activity rates by skill class and on average. The overall average increased 
by over 5 pp (from 74.7% to 80%), but within each skill class there was little change. This 
suggests that a skill upgrade, rather than labor market reforms, has been responsible for 
most of the progress seen since the turn of the century.
The participation of the high skill class (those with tertiary education) and those with 
medium skills (those with completed secondary education) increased only marginally 
(by 1 pp). The only group for which discernable progress is observed is the low-skilled 
(those with less than completed secondary education, or the International Standard 
Classification of Education (ISCED) level 0–2) whose participation rate increased by over 
3 pp (from 59.7% to 63%) over this period. If looking to trace the impact of labor market 
reforms, the focus would have to be on this segment of the population.
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A simple way to disentangle the influence of skill upgrading from all other effects is to 
compute the overall activity rates that would have resulted if only the activity rates by skill 
group had changed, but the composition of the labor force had remained unchanged. 
Weighting the 2016 activity rates with the 2000 skill composition yields an average activity 
rate of 76.5%. This implies that improvement in the composition of the European labor 
force contributed an additional 3.5 pp.
The actual changes in the composition of the working-age population correspond 
roughly to the numerical example given above: Figure 1 shows that between 2000 and 
2016, the share of the low-skilled population fell more than 12 pp. Over this period, the 
share of those with tertiary education grew by almost exactly the same amount (12.8 
pp), and there was also a slight increase in the share of the middle-skilled. This can be 
characterized as a switch of approximately 12% of the working-age population from low- 
to high-skilled, with the latter group having an activity rate about 25 pp higher than the 
former. One would then expect a 3 pp improvement of the activity rate.
This simple examination of activity rates by educational attainment thus suggests that 
the shift in the composition of the workforce by itself could account for about two-thirds 
of the overall increase in activity rates in Europe since 2000.
Aging
It is well known that the European labor force is aging. Moreover, the participation rate 
usually declines with age (after the so-called prime age of about 45 years). This means 
that, all things being equal, aging would be expected to have a negative impact on activity 
Figure 1. Skill class and labor force participation (LFP) rates in the EU 
Note: The 22 OECD members out of the EU28 (which account for 97% of EU GDP) are considered here. This figure
covers the working-age population (aged 25–65). 
Source: Population shares: OECD Data. Online at: https://data.oecd.org/eduatt/population-with-tertiary-education.
htm; LFP rates: OECD.Stat. Online at: http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?queryid=54741
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rates (and thus on the pool of the working-age population available for the labor market). 
However, it seems that there is a strong trend in the opposite direction.
As shown in the illustration on page 1, the activity rate has increased considerably over 
the last 20 years. Figure 2 disaggregates this rate by age, comparing 1995 data with that 
from 2013 (the last available year with full data). It is apparent that overall LFP rates are 
very high between the ages of 25 and 45–50. After that age, the rates fall off quickly, but 
how quickly has changed substantially over the last 20 years: the difference between the 
curves from 1995 and 2013 is rather small until about 45 years of age, and then widens 
rapidly. This implies that the most significant change from 1995 until 2016 has been the 
attachment of the elderly to the workforce, as evidenced by the almost 20 pp increase 
for those between the ages of 55 and 64. The key question is now: what were the reasons 
behind this change?
Do reforms matter?
The fact that employment and activity rates vary systematically with education levels 
suggests that the success of reforms should be measured, not by the overall employment 
and activity rates, but rather by how these indicators have changed for each specific skill 
class.
Figure 1 shows this for the total working-age population, aggregating all age groups. 
The main message is that the overall increase in activity rates observed over the last ten 
years for the EU28 (2.8 pp) is much larger than the improvement observed within most 
skill groups. The only skill class for which a significant increase in activity rates is actually 
observed is the low-skilled one. This should be seen as a success, since the purpose 
of most labor market reforms is to improve the participation of this group. However, 
Figure 2. Labor force participation (LFP) rates by age, EU15
Source: Eurostat. Online at: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Archive:Labour_
market_participation_statistics&oldid=233887
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Figure 2 suggests that the improvement of participation rates has been concentrated 
among the elderly. Hence, it is useful to analyze to what extent there has been an 
improvement in the activity rates by skill class and age group.
The following discussion concentrates on the older cohort of workers (aged 55–64) and 
on the subgroup of the low-skilled (compared to the overall cohort).
The European Commission has argued that the effectiveness of recent labor market and 
pension reforms enacted by euro area countries under financial stress can be seen via 
the increase in LFP rates among the elderly (aged 55–64) [1]. This is partially confirmed 
by the data. The activity rates of the those aged 55–64 in the EU reached almost 60% in 
2016, from about 40% in 2003, as shown by the vertical bars in Figure 3, which increase 
by about 1 pp per year.
Moreover, the figure reveals a considerable amount of convergence within the EU 
(see [10] for an analysis of the US case, which is quite different). This implies that the 
change in the LFP of the elderly was a broad movement, and that those countries where 
the activity rates of the elderly were lowest in 2003 improved the most over the next 
ten years.
A key question is thus: Is the improvement in overall participation rates due to reforms 
or to the composition effect? Given that the educational profile of the elderly is changing 
quickly, their LFP rates should be viewed by education level with a special focus on the 
subgroup of the low-skilled (compared to the overall cohort). This is done in Figure 3, 
which shows that there has been considerable improvement in the activity rates of this 
“marginal group” of low-skilled elderly as well. However, their activity rate remains much 
lower than the area-wide average for all age groups; and the 15 pp increase from 2003 to 
2016 was less than that of the total (which was almost 20 pp).
Figure 3. Convergence of activity rates for the population aged 55–64, EU 
Source: Author’s own compilation based on Eurostat data. Online at: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-
datasets/product?code=tepsr_wc160
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The convergence of activity rates for the low-skilled elderly has also been strong, as 
evidenced by the steep fall of the coefficient of variation. Overall, the activity rate data 
on the low-skilled elderly thus suggest that there has been considerable improvement 
in their labor market participation, albeit starting from a rather low level. This further 
suggests that there has been some structural change in the labor market conditions of 
the elderly, which goes beyond the change in skill composition that affects all age groups.
LIMITATIONS AND GAPS
Any analysis of European labor markets has to deal with a host of practical data issues. 
Different countries can display quite different patterns, not only because of varied national 
institutions, but also because the business cycle impacts national labor markets in different 
ways. The use of multi-country averages to average out these national idiosyncratic 
elements requires researchers to make difficult choices. For example, countries from 
Central and Eastern Europe were engaged in a radical process of transition during much 
of the 1990s. This implies that their pre-2000 data will be affected by different factors 
than that from the (15) “old” member states. This article has thus concentrated mostly 
on the advanced EU countries with a settled industrial structure.
This analysis has uncovered some striking developments in LFP patterns. The hypothesis 
that reforms in individual member countries were the key reason for increases in the 
participation rates is difficult to reconcile with the gradual and trend-wise increase in the 
activity rates of the elderly across countries and over time. It is difficult to pinpoint the 
results of individual labor market reforms because reforms across countries cannot be 
compared because they usually cover different aspects; and, for each specific country, it 
is difficult to disentangle the impact of a reform from the business cycle.
SUMMARY AND POLICY ADVICE
European labor markets exhibit important long-term trends which contradict the widely 
held view that excessive regulation impedes job growth. LFP rates have been increasing 
for more than 20 years. Moreover, the Great Recession has barely slowed this progress, 
even though one would expect that such a prolonged period of high unemployment 
would lead many discouraged job-seekers to abandon the labor market altogether.
The overall increase in activity rates across the EU seems to have two sources. First, 
the composition of the labor force is changing rapidly, with the share of the low-
skilled falling and that of the high-skilled increasing. Given that the latter have much 
higher employment rates, one would expect average activity rates to increase based 
solely on this change. Second, there has been an increase in the activity rates of the 
low-skilled.
The second finding would suggest that labor market reforms have made it more attractive 
for the low-skilled to enter the labor force. But closer inspection reveals that activity 
rates have increased mainly for the elderly among the low-skilled. There has been little 
change in the LFP rates of low-skilled non-elderly adults, and the rates for unskilled youth 
have actually fallen in some cases [11]. This suggests that pension reforms, in particular 
changes to early retirement rules, might have been more important than general labor 
market reforms (such as changing the costs of hiring and firing).
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Moreover, the increase in elderly activity rates (of all skill classes) has been broad-based 
and trend-wise. However, with the possible exception of the German “Hartz” reforms, it 
seems difficult to identify specific reform episodes, whether to pension systems or labor 
markets, which had an impact on this trend.
Overall, findings suggest that European labor markets are changing, but the main drivers 
seem to be the “massification” of tertiary education and the tightening of early retirement 
conditions, rather than reforms of the labor market itself. One corollary of this view 
is that the ongoing education expansion, especially in Europe’s south, should ensure a 
further increase in employment and participation rates.
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